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IN RE TRAVEL AGENCY COMMISSION ANTITRUST
LITIGATION: A CASE OF NONPRICE PREDATION
WITHIN THE TRAVEL INDUSTRY*
IAN E. PATE**
Wer reitet so spdt durch Nacht und Wind?
Es ist der Vater mit seinem Kind;
Er hat den Knaben wohl in dem Arm,
Er faBt ihn sicher, er halt ihn warm.
- Der Erlkinig, by Goethe.
I. INTRODUCTION
W TH MOST THINGS these days, we are confronted with
Vnumerous choices that complicate even the simplest travel
plans. As Goethe expressed in the above stanza, traveling can, at
times, be stressful, so we seek security and peace of mind from
the Night and Wind. For those travelers using travel agencies,
the complexity and worry of travel is eased by the accumulated
experience of travel professionals who are more accustomed in
dealing with airlines and other travel providers. For example, in
one particular test, a travel agency saved a flier $1,000 on a flight
from Chicago to Tokyo "by spotting hairline distinctions be-
tween minimum-stay requirements among airlines."' Thus, one
can imagine the frustration of each traveler who, on his own,
has to learn "the travel business," suffer the effects of "revenue
management,"2 or otherwise go to each airline either by phone
or the Internet in an attempt to make the best deal. As with
* Dieser Artikel ist in Dankbarkeit der Firma und Belegschaft von "Overseas
Travel" gewidmet, die mir die Welt gezeigt haben, und all den anderen
Personen, die diese Reise so lohnend machten.
** B.A., Economics, Florida State University, 1996; J.D., Florida State Univer-
sity College of Law, 1999.
1 Lynn Woods, Airfares Just Keep on Skyrocketing, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FIN.
MAG., Jan. 1998, at 127.
2 Revenue management is the "well-developed strategy" whereby one seat on
an airline may carry nine, sixteen, nineteen, or even thirty different fares. See
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most things these days, this time could be spent more produc-
tively elsewhere.
While airlines may be welcoming the day of no commission
payments, it is unlikely that travelers will benefit. Travel agents
have expertise and experience, which they use to create stress-
free travel plans. Like a tax accountant or a lawyer, a travel
agent navigates through the complexities of his trade so that his
client does not have to. But this service is not ultimately free.
Since the airlines stopped paying commissions on ticket sales
in 1995, travel agencies have quickly been forced out of busi-
ness. If there were ever an example to highlight the goals and
policies behind antitrust laws, the dissolution of one business
group due to the strong-arming of another makes an excellent
cause celebre. Since the commission cuts by the airlines, travel
agents have fallen by the way side, seemingly unnoticed. This
paper will therefore bring to light the tenuous business relation-
ship between the airlines and travel agencies and attempt to
pick up where the court in In Re Travel Agency Commission Anti-
trust Litigation left off-that is, to provide a legal analysis of the
airlines' termination of that relationship.
As might be evident, the legal conclusion of this paper is that
airlines were engaging in collusion and conspiracy to eliminate
travel agencies. Granted, there is no express legal obligation for
airlines to pay commissions, and the airlines claim legitimate jus-
tifications for their actions. Therefore, antitrust law will be set
forth as relevant to this specific situation, and thereafter, the
airlines' business decisions will be analyzed to separate legiti-
mate business conduct from unlawful collusion and unreasona-
ble restraints on trade. In doing so, this paper will conclude
that the airlines' major motivation for bringing about such a
change was the pursuit of increased oligopoly power and profits.
A. THE LAWSUIT: IN RE TRAVEL AGENCY COMMISSION
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
3
In 1995, the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA)
brought suit against the seven largest American airlines, which
control eighty-five percent of the domestic air travel market, for
Jeffrey Leib, Fare Game: Airline Pricing Plans Aim High; Goals are Full Planes, Top-
Dollar Tickets, DENVER POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at A-01.
3 898 F. Supp. 685 (D. Minn. 1995) [hereinafter Travel Agency].
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antitrust violations.4 Earlier that year, the defendant airlines
had brought about a fundamental change in both the air travel
industry and the nature of the business relationship between
travel agents and airlines. Since 1960, airlines had paid a cus-
tomary ten percent commission to travel agents for each ticket
sold, and after deregulation of the airline industry, the "use of
travel agencies significantly increased."5 Over the years, the trav-
eling public developed a reliance on travel agents for advice and
booking, especially as the airlines' fare structures became more
complex.6 In turn, the travel agents developed a reliance on
commission income, and the airlines utilized this system as an
efficient means of ticket sales and distribution. By the time of
the commission cuts and caps, travel agencies were selling eighty
percent of airline tickets.'
The beginning of the end occurred on December 1, 1994,
when Delta Airlines reduced its commission on international
fares from the customary ten percent to eight percent following
leaks to the press earlier that fall indicating Delta's compensa-
tion scheme to travel agents was under reconsideration.8 Then,
on February 9, 1995, Delta announced commission caps on do-
mestic flights,9 effective immediately. While Delta did not actu-
ally implement these caps until April 1, the other airlines
quickly followed suit."°
Within twenty-four hours of Delta's February announcement,
both American Airlines and Northwest Airlines announced that
they were also implementing Delta's plan, to be effective as soon
as they adjusted their respective computerized booking pro-
grams." On February 13 and 14, United, USAir, TWA, and
Continental all announced their own commission plans based
4 See id. at 687 n.1. Defendants were American Airlines, Delta Airlines, North-
west Airlines, United Airlines, USAir, Continental Airlines, and Trans World Air-
lines (TWA). See id. Defendants' market share is measured in terms of revenue
passenger miles. See Plaintiffs' Consolidated and Amended Class Action Com-
plaint, at 13, In re Travel Agency Comm'n Antitrust Litig., 898 F. Supp. 685 (D.
Minn. 1995) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Complaint].
5 Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp., No. 98-1033, 1999 WL
46756, at *1, (4th Cir. Feb. 3, 1999) (per curiam).
6 See id.
7 See Allison Connolly, Travel Agents Take Third Hit from Airlines, MIDDLESEX
NEWS, Dec. 6, 1998.
8 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 21.
9 See Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 687.
10 See id. The caps were $50 on round-trip tickets priced above $500 and $25
on one-way tickets priced above $250. See id.
11 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 22.
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on Delta's. 12 Within days of Delta's announcement, the long-
established partnership between the airlines and travel agents
was over.
After two more rounds of cap reductions, United Airlines,
American Airlines, Northwest, Continental, Delta, and USAir
had limited commission payments to $100 for round trips and
$50 for one-way trips.13 These caps had a far more profound
impact on agent income than the reduced commission rates.
For example, for a round-trip ticket costing $3,742, an eight per-
cent commission would yield $299.36. The travel agency, how-
ever, would only receive $100 due to the cap-a forfeiture of
nearly $200 in commission.' 4 One agency reported that the ag-
gregate forfeiture amount meant a twenty percent reduction in
gross revenue, severely undercutting its ability to operate at a
profit. 15
The reduced commission structures quickly became the norm
across most air carriers,16 and except for America West and
Northwest Airlines, administrative exchange fees (at $75.00)
and commission fees (at $25.00) became identical among the
defendant airlines.1 7 Ironically, almost a year before Delta made
its first intimations of commission reductions, the U.S. District
Court of Washington D.C. had enjoined the airlines from engag-
ing in collusive practices regarding fares. 18
Although ASTA survived a difficult summary judgment chal-
lenge,' 9 it settled out of court for $86 million, which was divided
among ASTA members20 after attorneys' fees were collected. 21
Considering that ASTA's domestic membership numbers
around 11,00022 and travel agents were losing around $1 million
12 See id. at 23-24.
13 See Connolly, supra note 7.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See U.S. Domestic Carrier Commission Policies, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexan-
dria, Va.), Oct. 1997, at 4.
17 See Airline Administrative Exchange and Commission Fee Chart, DATELINE ASTA
(ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Jan. 1998, Issue II, at 2.
18 See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., Civ. A. No. 42-2854 SSH, 1994
WL 454730, at *1 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1994).
19 See Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 691.
20 See Fax from Jeanne Epping, President & Chief Executive Officer, ASTA, to
all ASTA members 1 (Sept. 5, 1996) (on file with author).
21 See Fax from Jeanne Epping, President & Chief Executive Officer, ASTA, to
all ASTA members I (Sept. 6, 1996) (on file with author).
22 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 11.
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daily,23 this settlement was no impressive victory. But ASTA and
its counsel feared protracted litigation with an uncertain out-
come. 24  Moreover, the Department of Justice stated that it
"would not permit any agreement requiring the lifting of the
caps," and the court expressed its unwillingness to "direct the
future commission policies of the airlines. '25 Therefore, ASTA
accepted the settlement offer, which was "among the largest of
all antitrust settlements. 26
Since the settlement, ASTA has called into question other an-
ticompetitive airline practices. Because travel agents are depen-
dent upon the airline owned and operated computerized
booking systems such as the Computer Reservations Systems 27
(CRS), Airlines Reporting Corporation 28 (ARC), and Ameri-
can's closely held SABRE, 29 they have been subject to further
abuse. For one, ASTA requested that ARC include a space on
the airline tickets showing the printing fees that the travel
agents were forced to pass along to their customers in lieu of a
commission payment,30 and the Department of Justice has inves-
tigated "possible tacit collusion among the airlines through
[ARC]."' 31 Second, ASTA emphasized "that the airline-owned
23 See Skye McQueen, Comment, The Summary Judgment Standard in Antitrust
Conspiracy Cases and In Re Travel Agency Commission Antitrust Litigation, 62 J. AIR L.
& COM. 1155, 1158 (1997).
24 See Fax, supra note 20 at 1. See also Fax from DATELINE ASTA to all ASTA
members 2 (June 10, 1997) (on file with author).
25 Fax, supra note 20, at 1.
26 Id.
27 CRS "is essential to all travel agencies because it carries the fares, schedules,
and flight availability of all carriers and receives and dissemintates the informa-
tion collected by the Airline Tariff Publishing Company on a daily basis." Plain-
tiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 4.
28 "ARC provides a centralized method for administering most of the details of
the agency relationship between airlines and travel agents." Id. "Its purpose is to
act as a clearinghouse through which airlines and travel agents deal with each
other. It provides three services to its members: agency accreditation, the provi-
sion of common ticket stock, and a centralized reporting system through which
the agencies report and settle their accounts with the airlines." Omega World
Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp., No. 98-1033, 1999 WL 46756, at *1 (4th
Cir. Feb. 3, 1999) (per curiam).
29 SeeJennifer Michels, First Class Travel Insists Airline Collusion is Alive and Well,
TRAVEL AGENT, June 22, 1998, at 6.
3o See ASTA's Post-Cuts Strategy Fights Today for Travel Agents' Future, DATELINE
ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Special Issue No. 18-97, at 1.
31 Russell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and Other Exclusionary Conduct in the
Airline Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 281, 293 (1992).
But see Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 111 F.3d 14 (4th
Cir. 1997) (denying Omega's motion for a temporary injunction preventing TWA
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SATO directly competes against all travel agents. SATO's cost
factor, which is equivalent to the agent's commission, is much
higher than 8 percent. "' 2 This raised the question of whether
the airlines' claim that they can more efficiently distribute tick-
ets is indeed valid. Third, travel agents complained of new diffi-
culties in using SABRE and in negotiating for SABRE contracts.
Some also alleged that American was creating tying contracts
whereby travel agents' corporate clients were enticed to get SA-
BRE access themselves in order to get corporate discounts. Rely-
ing on the Department of Transportation's own statement that
"the agency system is the most efficient means of distributing
tickets," ASTA requested the DOT to investigate similar abuses
of the airline-owned CRS, 1 such as the prevention of display
bias, shorter contract options, and the prohibition on tying ar-
rangements, 4 but to no avail. In addition to leaving travel
agents exposed to this further harassment at the hands of air-
lines, the end result of the settlement was to leave the possible
illegality of the airlines' conduct unaddressed.
B. THE TRAVEL AGENTS' RESPONSE
Before the major airlines implemented their second round of
commission cuts, the president of ASTA, Mike Spinelli, deliv-
ered a speech at ASTA's 67th World Travel Congress wherein he
asked, "Isn't this the greatest business in the world?"35
This world has 5.5 billion people. By 2020, we reach 8.5 billion
people! Only 550 million of them travel internationally. By
2005, left alone, travel will grow by 50 percent .... For those
taking trips, travel agents make 55 percent of the decisions [, and
frequent fliers] prefer to call travel agents over and above any
other booking means, like airlines, the Internet, or their own
pC.
3 6
In answering his own question, he concluded, "Indeed, it is the
greatest business in the world! '317
from canceling agency's ARC subscription on the grounds that the agency's anti-
trust allegations will probably fail in light of the "at will" nature of the contract).
32 Klingaman, supra note 31
33 ASTA Appeals to DOT for Fair Consumer Access to Air Fares, DATELINE ASTA
(ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Jan. 1998, Issue I, at 1.
'34, See id.
35 ASTA President Mike Spinnelli, Address at ASTA's 67th World Travel Con-






In support of his optimistic outlook, Spinelli could point to
numerous endorsements of the travel agent system as the ideal,
and most popular, means of ticket distribution. For example,
the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion applauded ASTA for keeping consumers aware of various
schemes of travel fraud.3 8 ABC's news program, 20/20, advised
travelers to use travel agents after conducting a comparison of
between "airline ticket prices as quoted by a travel agent versus
airline reservations agents."39 Fodor's, the largest English lan-
guage travel guidebook publisher, also endorsed the use of
travel agencies,4" as did numerous other newspapers and
magazines.4
For travel agents, such accolades were nice to hear, but did
not pay their bills. In its fight against commission cuts, ASTA
was forced to expend dwindling resources lobbying federal and
state congresses for favorable legislation as part of its "Opera-
tion: Take Control" initiative.4 2 Such efforts included the draft-
ing of model state legislation, called the "Travel Agency Fair
Treatment Act" (TAFT), to "bar any travel service supplier from
'substantially changing the competitive circumstances of an ap-
pointment without good cause.""' At the federal level, ASTA
lobbied Congress to pass various laws to improve travel service
and to regulate collusive practices.44
38 See FTC Applauds ASTA, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Mar. 1998,
Issue I, at 3.
9 Why Use a Travel Agent? Ask 14 Million 20/20 Viewers, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA,
Alexandria, Va.), Feb. 1998, Issue II, at 1.
40 See id. at 4.
41 See LA Times Shines Light on Value of Knowledgeable Travel Agents, DATELINE
ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Oct. 1996, Issue I, at 6; Consumer Group Study
Touts the Value of Travel Agents, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Nov.
1997, Issue II, at 4 ("California PIRG [Public Interest Research Group] Con-
sumer Advocate Jon Golinger said that it is ridiculous that consumers aren't be-
ing told the lowest airfares . . . .He also said that airlines won't stop their
deceptive pricing practices [such as passive bookings, back-to-backs, hidden city,
and refunding the non-refundable] unless consumers and the Department of
Justice put an end to them."); ASTA in the News, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexan-
dria, Va.), Jan. 1998, Issue I, at 4, Issue II, at 3 (highlighting those newspapers
recommending the use of travel agents for airline bookings).
42 See Critical "Take Control" Legislation Efforts Need Push from ASTA Members,
DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), May 1998, Issue I, at 1.
43 ASTA Proposes State Law for Fair Treatment of Travel Agencies, DATELINE ASTA
(ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 1997, Issue I, at 2.
44 See ASTA Takes Member Concerns to the United States Congress, DATELINE ASTA
(ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Apr. 1998, Issue I, at 1, 6 (Summarizing S. 1331-Avia-
tion Competition Enhancement Act of 1997; H.R. 2748-Airline Service Im-
1999] 947
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ASTA also launched a national public relations campaign to
educate the public about the new ticketing fees, which travelers
have never paid before. Named the "Air 'Fair' Challenge," this
initiative called upon travelers to ask airlines:
For the specified route, do other airlines offer lower fares? Do
other airlines have a non-stop or direct flight, or provide more
convenient departure times? Could you suggest a hotel down-
town? Is there a number where I could call you directly later?
Have other travelers had any problems at this destination?45
Numerous other activities and tips also appeared throughout
ASTA's newsletter, DATELINE ASTA.
II. ARGUMENT
Section One of the Sherman Act states, "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."46 Literally, this text
would prohibit any contract or agreement between two business-
persons because by its very nature, a business agreement re-
strains trade. For this reason, the Sherman Act is limited to
those agreements that unreasonably limit trade. In other words,
only agreements with an anticompetitive effect, and thus harm-
ful to consumers, are considered Sherman Act violations.
To prove a Sherman Act violation, a plaintiff must establish
three prima facie elements. 47 The first is proof of a contract,
agreement, or conspiracy for the purposes of restraining trade.
The second is proof that the restraint affects interstate com-
merce. The third element, which developed through case law, is
proof that the restraint of trade is unreasonable. Thus, a con-
spiracy in violation of the antitrust laws is one that limits the




provement Act of 1997; H.R. 3160-Airline Competition and Lower Fares Act; S.
803-United States Cruise Tourism Act of 1997; and "Consumer Access to Travel
Information Act of 1998").
45 Agents Challenge Airlines: Provide the Same Level of Quality Travel Service,
DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 1997, Issue I, at 1.
46 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
47 See, e.g., Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 F.2d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1991)
(delineating the necessary elements of a § 1 claim).




The defendant airlines' conduct satisfied all three of these el-
ements. Because the defendants' operations are wide-spread,
this analysis assumes the second element-the restraint affects
interstate commerce. The analysis thus focuses on the first and
third elements and concludes that the airlines colluded to elimi-
nate travel agents and that this behavior was an unreasonable
restraint of trade.
A. COLLUSION
In proving the first element, that the defendants engaged in
concerted action, a plaintiff need not have direct evidence such
as a "smoking contract" revealing that the respective businesses
had any specific intent to collude. Rather, a plaintiff may
demonstrate collusion inferentially through circumstantial evi-
dence. The reason for this is perfectly sensible since firms rarely
sign formal contracts to collude. More often deals are done sur-
reptitiously, and for the antitrust laws to be enforceable, plain-
tiffs must be able to show collusion through other means.49
While reliance on inferential evidence is necessary in antitrust
litigation, courts hold the quality of this evidence to a high stan-
dard and greatly limit the range of possible inferences.5"
1. Surviving Summary Judgment
In order to enforce this high standard, the U.S. Supreme
Court established a specific summary judgment inquiry that a
plaintiff's evidence must satisfy in an antitrust case. In Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the Supreme
Court stated two issues that district courts should consider at the
summary judgment stage: (1) whether the defendants had any
rational motive to join the alleged conspiracy, and (2) whether
the defendants' conduct is consistent with the defendants' in-
dependent interests.5 In evaluating these issues, the Supreme
Court advised the district courts to "consider the nature of the
alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementa-
tion. '5 2 In other words, the purpose of the inquiry is to deter-
mine whether the collusion makes good business sense.
49 "As is usual in cases of alleged unlawful agreements to restrain commerce,
[plaintiffs are] without aid of direct testimony that the [defendants] entered into
any agreement with each other to impose the restrictions .... Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
50 See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
51 See id. at 587.
52 Id. at 588.
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The summary judgment inquiry established in Matsushita is
often characterized as a stricter or heightened summary judg-
ment standard." In Travel Agency, the airline defendants argued
that Matsushita established a heightened standard of proof
whereby plaintiffs must support their inference with evidence
falling just short of a preponderance.54 The court in Travel
Agency, however, was quick to point out that plaintiffs carry no
special burden under Matsushita to survive summary judg-
ment.55 Rather, the Matsushita inquiry distinguishes inferences
that are reasonable in business terms from those that are not.
56
Travel Agency survived summary judgment, despite the height-
ened standard instituted in Matsushita.57 By virtue of ASTA's
case surviving summary judgment under this special standard,
one can infer that ASTA's allegations had some merit. Unfortu-
nately, the court offered no in-depth commentary, but instead
seemed satisfied that ASTA's contentions were sufficiently rea-
sonable based on the evidence that ASTA wanted to present.58
While it is not necessary in light of the district court's opinion to
argue that ASTA's case should survive summary judgment, it is
helpful to distinguish Travel Agency from Matsushita to see why
ASTA survived summary judgment. In this way, it becomes clear
that unlike in Matsushita, collusion made perfectly good busi-
ness sense in Travel Agency.
In Matsushita, American television manufacturers alleged that
twenty-one Japanese corporations conspired to "dump" Japa-
nese-made televisions on the American market at prices below
production costs. 59 The goal, as alleged, was to drive American
manufacturers out of business and later increase prices at will
after American competition had been eliminated. The Court
found, however, that the plaintiffs' inferences of price predation
made no economic sense and that the defendants had no mo-
53 See also Brokers' Assistant, Inc. v. Williams Real Estate Co., 646 F. Supp. 1110,
1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing Matsushita as indication of "a growing willingness on
the part of the federal courts to use summary judgment as an effective tool for
expediting litigation").
54 See Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 690.
55 See id. (quoting Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504
U.S. 451, 468 (1992)).
56 See id.
57 See id. at 690-91.
58 ASTA asserted the existence of "a set of occurrences, speeches, meetings,
events, official and unofficial corporate utterances, and conferences," which was
"purposefully designed to communicate" the desire to collude. Id. at 691.
51 See Matushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78.
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tive to join the conspiracy.60 In support of this conclusion, the
Court emphasized that the defendants had engaged in this activ-
ity for over fifteen years.6' If their plan, as alleged, had been
successful, the Court reasoned that the Japanese manufacturers
would have to greatly increase prices, requiring yet another act
of collusion, to recoup the losses incurred over such a long pe-
riod of time. These high prices would, in turn, encourage
American upstarts or Korean manufacturers to enter the mar-
ket.6 2 The proposition that the Japanese firms could eventually
eliminate all of their rivals, recoup all of their lost income, and
maintain the monopoly in order to earn the subsequent monop-
oly profits was unreasonable." Instead, the Court found it more
likely that the Japanese "were just engaged in hard
competition." 64
The lynchpin of the Supreme Court's analysis was that there
was little economic motive for firms to conspire to charge preda-
tory prices. The airlines in Travel Agency, however, were not en-
gaged in predatory pricing, but rather nonprice predation.
Under nonprice predation, the predatory firms suffer no short-
term losses and need not totally exclude rivals for success. 65 In-
stead, the predatory firms make rivals' operations unprofitable
by increasing the targets' costs, limiting the targets' income, or
both.66 Later, when the firms gain market share, they raise
prices above prior competitive levels.67 In other words, to form
a cartel for the purposes of nonprice predation makes good
business sense from the viewpoint that the colliding firms suffer
neither short-term nor long-term losses.
ASTA showed that the circumstances reasonably tended to ex-
clude the possibility that the airlines acted independently.
Thus, ASTA survived summary judgment:
[D]uring the late 1980s, American Airlines and United Airlines
made separate unilateral commission cuts. Competitor airlines
did not follow, and travel agents' customers apparently patron-
60 See id. at 587.
61 See id. at 591-92 n.15 (quoting Judge Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63




65 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 18, NONPRICE PREDATION
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ized airlines which continued to pay the 10% commission. Both
American Airlines and United Airlines abandoned their commis-
sion revision programs shortly thereafter. Extrapolating from
this evidence, [ASTA] suggest[ed] that [the defendant air-
lines] . . . conspired to ensure all airlines would cut
commissions. 6"
The reason for this original failure to cut commissions is sim-
ple. Travel agents have the power to direct flyers to those air-
lines providing better terms to both the traveler and the travel
agents. This ability to influence bookings provides airlines with
an added incentive not to be the lone airline slashing commis-
sions."9 If the airlines acted together, however, they could
thwart this ability and pay less, or eventually nothing, in
commissions.70
2. Parallelism
While showing that collusion would have been economically
plausible gets a case past summary judgment, it is, alone, insuffi-
cient to win a case. To win, a plaintiff first must prove concerted
activity or a "conscious commitment to a common scheme"
shared by the co-conspirators, 7' but this does not mean a plain-
68 Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 688 n.5. See also Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra
note 4, at 4 ("In 1981, United lowered its commission rates by imposing a system
of flat fee commissions, based on miles traveled per ticket. After the system was in
place for only four or five days, United reverted to the system of percentage com-
mission rates when other carriers declined to follow United's lead.").
69 To increase their patronage, new entrants to the market or other airlines
without the market share that the defendants in Travel Agency enjoy often use the
power of travel agents to direct flyers to those airlines offering favorable terms.
Even after the big airlines cut their commissions, these smaller airlines continued
to offer customary commission rates. By November 1997, those airlines that did
not cut commissions included American Trans Air, Eastwind Airlines, Laker Air-
ways, Midway Airlines, Air Tran Airlines, and other similarly small domestic and
foreign carriers. See Airlines That Have NOT Cut Commissions, HOT FLASHES (Cen-
tral/North Fla. ASTA, Bartow, Fla.), Nov. 1997, at 3.
70 "The airlines estimate, and for these purposes the plaintiffs have not con-
tested, that they will realize substantial savings as a result of the revised commis-
sions. For example, Northwest Airlines estimates an annual savings of $50-58
million .... American Airlines estimates a $150 million annual savings." Travel
Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 688 n.6.
71 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984). See also
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. North Am. Salt Co., Inc., 1994 WL 735932, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Nov. 2, 1994) ("[T]here is no specific requirement under § 1 that the alleged
conspirators have a complete 'mutuality of interest."'); Petruzzi's IGA Supermar-
kets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he
defendants need not share the same motive. Rather, all that is required is that
they each have a motive to conspire.").
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tiff must demonstrate an express agreement.7 2 The same pow-
ers of inference permitted to present a case with genuine,
triable issues of fact may also be used to prove an inferred agree-
ment among competitors to satisfy the first element of a Section
One violation.73
Evidence of parallel business behavior, or parallelism, is one
way of proving this first element of conspiracy and collusion, but
absolute parallelism alone will not support a Section One claim.
A plaintiff must also prove that the parallelism was not the result
of coincidence, independent actions, or the natural forces
within the relevant market; but instead, the parallelism was pur-
poseful and served as the basis for the actions of each colluding
firm.
To prove actionable parallelism, the plaintiff must distinguish
natural parallel behavior from conscious parallel behavior. Nat-
ural parallel conduct can often be consistent with the rational
exercise of independent business decisions. For example, in
Theatre Enterprises v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.,"4 suburban
theaters alleged that various movie producers and distributors
had conspired "to restrict 'first-run' pictures to downtown Balti-
more theatres, thus confining its suburban theaters to subse-
quent runs and unreasonable 'clearances."' 75 After first noting
that there was no direct evidence of an illegal agreement, the
Court proceeded to list the various economic factors behind the
arrangement. 76 Thus, what appeared to be collusion between
film producers was in fact attributable to legitimate business
considerations. Courts are less willing to allow an inference of
anticompetitive conduct when the conduct in question has sig-
nificant procompetitive benefits 77 or when allowing such an in-
ference might chill management's reasonable attempts to
maintain a firm's competitive edge.78
72 See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey et al. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50-60
(1911); Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 815 F. 2d 522, 525 (9th Cir.
1987).
73 See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S.
537, 540-41 (1954). "[A]n agreement may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence of 'a common design and understanding."' Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525 (quot-
ing American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
74 346 U.S. 537 (1954) (suit brought under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act).
75 Id. at 538.
76 See id. at 539-40.
77 See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust
Litigation, 906 F.2d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
78 See id. at 440.
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For example, banks set their prime lending rate similar or
equivalent to major banks. 9 Reliance on the rates, which indus-
try leaders establish, is a convenient way for the banks to deter-
mine the national market rate.80 This process serves to stabilize
interest rates."' In comparison, those markets that are not as
stabile, but rather supercompetitive, also tend to be naturally
parallel as firms attempt to avoid price wars. 82 These very differ-
ent market structures share the common characteristic of signif-
icant interdependence among the competing firms.8"
A market dominated by an oligopoly presents a similar situa-
tion of natural parallelism and interdependency.
"[O]ligopolists acting independently might sell at the same
above-marginal cost price as their competitors because the firms
are interdependent and competitors would match any price cut.
Therefore, they quickly learn that price cuts do not increase
market share and return to their noncompetitive pricing. 84
The airline industry, especially after deregulation, is an example
of parallelism in an oligopolistic market. Because the airlines
operate within an "extremely competitive" market, a change in
fare price by one "will inevitably result in a similar change by
other carriers. 8
5
Precisely because of the detrimental effects of price wars or
other consequences associated with such a tight market, the dis-
trict court in Continental Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.
used reasoning similar to that used in Matsushita and found an
alleged scheme of collusive price predation in the airline indus-
try as economically implausible.8" To prove parallel conduct in
that case, the plaintiff, Continental Airlines, cited public state-
ments by the defendants, American Airlines, United, and Delta,
announcing price cuts "almost simultaneously." Continental al-
leged that the price cuts were an attempt to force it from the
relevant market.8 7 The court, however, reasoned that the larger
airlines "would not be able to maintain supracompetitive prices
79 See Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 528.
80 See id. at 526.
81 See id. at 528.
8,2 See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1244.
8 3 See id.
84t Id.






long enough to recover their losses and make a profit ... "88
Therefore, because the defendant airlines had no rational mo-
tive to collude, parallel action was not conclusive proof of
collusion.
In Travel Agency, the same airlines made announcements of
common conduct within a very short time span, and in response
to antitrust allegations, posited the same defense. "[A]irlines
operate in an oligopolistic market, with widely disseminated in-
formation. Under such conditions, they argue that rapid price
coalescence is an economic inevitability. They claim these fac-
tors led to the swift adoption of the [commission cuts.]" 8 9 But
both American and United Airlines quickly abandoned their
earlier, unilateral attempts to cut commissions.9" Therefore, it
seems the only successful way to cut commissions would be to
work together, the motive to maintain the cartel being the addi-
tional profits that each of them would inevitably make.
The airlines' assertion in Travel Agency that the swift adoption
of commission cuts was due to natural parallelism in an oligo-
polistic market may actually tend to establish an inference of
collusion. First, if the commission cuts were indeed due to com-
petitive pressure, one would expect these savings to be passed
along to consumers. But despite the airlines' assertions that the
commission cuts are a cost-cutting measure, airfares have dra-
matically increased in price in the year since then with domestic
flights increasing by 17% and international flights by 30%.91
Second, the defense of natural parallelism is unconvincing
against an allegation of nonprice predation. In Continental, it
was clear to see how price predation could seriously injure the
colluding parties, especially if they had no reasonable expecta-
tion of a return on their "investment" in below cost pricing. In
nonprice predation, however, those in the cartel not only gain
during the predatory behavior, but gain later when the competi-
tion is eliminated. Interdependency of a natural oligopoly can,
88 Id.
89 Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 688.
90 See id. at 688 n.5.
91 See Woods, supra note 1 at 127. The airlines' have a track record of not
passing savings along to consumers. For example, when certain federal airline
taxes reverted, the airlines did not lower fares, but rather increased them by ten
percent. Likewise, as the cost ofjet fuel fell to a nine-year low, airfares continued
to rise. See ASTA Calls on Airlines to Pass Along Savings on Fuel Prices to Travelers,
HOT FLASHES (Central/North Fla. ASTA, Bartow, Fla.), April, 1998, at 4.
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therefore, be evidence of unlawful nonprice predation rather
than a defense to it.92
Similarly, firms may cite to the legitimate effects of a natural
oligopoly as pretext for collusion that, in of itself, may be con-
strued as evidence of collusion:93
[S] tatements regarding the competitiveness of the air transporta-
tion market cut both ways: they also tend to support an inference
that the alleged conspirators could have reasonably believed that
their scheme had a good chance of success because the factors
cited ... would tend to mask [their] actions. Air carriers tend to
match the price changes of other air carriers. Thus, the alleged
conspirators could have reasonably assumed that it would not at-
tract too much unwanted attention if other airlines lowered (at
the beginning of the conspiracy) or raised (after smaller compet-
itors had been driven from the market) their prices in response
to American's price initiatives.94
If the public has grown accustomed to a certain degree of price
parallelism, then the airlines might also feel comfortable that
their up-to-now successful defense of oligopolistic coaslescence
will also mask nonprice parallelism.
3. Plus Factors
After showing that the parallelism between named firms is
conscious rather than natural, the second analysis necessary in
extrapolating unlawful collusion from parallel business activity
consists of "plus factors." Without the added plus factors, con-
scious parallelism, per se, would not support a violation of the
Sherman Act.9" These plus factors are, in effect, the little bit
extra needed before the courts will allow circumstantial evi-
dence as conclusive proof of collusion. Examples of plus factors
include "price parallelism, product uniformity, exchange of
price information, and opportunity to meet to form anti-com-
petitive policies."96
92 See Barry v. Blue Cross of Ca., 805 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that interdependence is required to infer a conspiracy from parallelism.).
93 See Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F. 2d 1473, 1479-80 (9th Cir. 1986).
94 Continental, 824 F. Supp. at 705 (the quotation continues: "Moreover, many
inefficient air carriers have gone bankrupt since deregulation, and observers
might tend to credit the passing of a few more smaller carriers to inefficiency
rather than to predatory pricing.").
95 See Theatre Enterprises, 346 U.S. at 541.
96 Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525-26.
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Through plus factors, a plaintiff shows not only that the paral-
lelism was conscious, but also that the named firms had both a
plausible reason and an opportunity to collude. Depending on
the case, this often amounts to re-proving that the parallelism
was conscious, but with more conclusive, direct evidence of an
agreement. At times, it even appears that the requirement for
these additional factors contradicts the Court's assurance that
because of the difficulty in proving antitrust violations through
direct evidence, inferential evidence suffices.9 7
For example, in American Tobacco, Co. v. United States, 8 the de-
fendant cigarette manufacturers were quite bold in their price
fixing schemes. Within the same day of defendant Reynolds'
unexpected increase of its list price, the other major competi-
tors raised their list prices to the same level, seizing "the oppor-
tunity of making some money."9 9 When consumers switched to
minor, cheaper brands in response to the price hike, the de-
fendants again acted in concert, this time to lower prices to a
level that would eliminate the competition from the minor
brands.'00 Then the defendants began to raise prices again; this
time, when a retailer heard of a price hike announcement from
one producer and attempted to buy from another, the other re-
fused to fill the order until it had also announced its price
hike. 10'
Of course, as antitrust law has evolved, so has big business's
attempts to act more surreptitiously. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States,10 2 a movie exhibitor sent a letter to eight film dis-
tributors naming all eight as addressees in the letter. The letter
urged the distributors to include in all subsequent licensing
agreements with exhibitors a provision fixing prices on admis-
sion and another provision limiting the number of double fea-
97 See, e.g., Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1233-42. (approving defendants' testimonial
evidence of an agreement and secretly recorded tapes of defendants discussing
their agreement as acceptable plus factors, but disapproving evidence in the form
of market analysis presented by expert testimony and defendants' infrequent ac-
count turnovers as insufficient to draw definite conclusions despite their sugges-
tive value); Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 528 (requiring proof of an agreement in the form
of actual price fixing rather than inferential proof based on proffered evidence);
United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (approv-
ing plaintiff's proffered evidence of a confidential, informal agreement to fix
prices charged to specific customers).
98 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
- Id. at 805.
100 See id. at 806.
101 See id. at 808.
102 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
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tures. Subsequently, all eight distributors put these provisions
in their contracts. This letter did not reveal an agreement, for-
mal or informal, but rather its evidentiary value was limited to
showing that each distributor was aware "that the proposals were
under consideration by the others."10' The Interstate Circuit let-
ter highlights the second way in which plus factors are used-
that is, to show that the conduct would be in the parties' self-
interest if all acted in the same way, but would be contrary to
their self-interest if each acted alone. Such evidence is the most
compelling plus factor. 10 4
Each was aware that all were in active competition and that with-
out substantially unanimous action with respect to the restric-
tions for any given territory there was risk of a substantial loss of
the business and good will of the subsequent-run and independ-
ent exhibitors, but that with it there was the prospect of in-
creased profits. 105
Because the proposal meant a dramatic departure from previ-
ous business practices, the court reasoned further that without
an agreement diversity of action would follow:
It taxes credulity to believe that the several distributors would, in
the circumstances, have accepted and put into operation with
substantial unanimity such far-reaching changes in their business
methods without some understanding that all were to join, and
we reject as beyond the range of probability that it was the result
of mere chance.10
6
The Third Circuit restated this principle in Petruzzi's IGA Su-
permarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.'07 In Petruzzi's, the defend-
ants had an agreement not to bid as aggressively on each other's
existing accounts as they bid on new accounts. The Third Cir-
cuit noted that these actions, if done independently, would be
against the self-interest of the individual defendants. 0 This fact
was an important plus factor that the court considered in revers-
ing the district court's granting of summary judgment.
Another plus factor is the opportunity to collude such as
through correspondence, meetings, or other communications.
This can be necessary to prove "that the defendants were con-
103 Id. at 222.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 222.
106 Id. at 223.




scious of each other's conduct and that this awareness was an
element in their decision making processes."' 9 For example,
the Interstate Circuit letter served as a vehicle to create awareness
of one distributor's proposal. 110 Indeed, the courts treat infor-
mation disseminated privately as more suspect than through
public channels,1 ' but this does not mean that exchange of in-
formation publicly as with the banks in Wilcox is per se
inapplicable.
The most probable reason why some courts require almost or
absolute direct proof of carteling as the plus factor, while others
allow less stringent forms of circumstantial evidence, may be re-
lated to the type of antitrust violation alleged. In those cases
where plaintiffs had to carry a higher standard of proof, the al-
leged anticompetitive conduct consisted of fixing prices at an
artificially low level to drive out weaker competitors. 12 In such a
cartel, there is great incentive to cheat because firms are per-
haps incurring losses or at least foregoing greater earnings by
charging below market prices. 113 But in nonprice predation, the
colluding firms bear no losses, and as a consequence, this "game
theory" or "prisoner's dilemma" is not a problem. For this rea-
son, the heightened standard placed on plus factors found in
price predation cases should not be applied in nonprice preda-
tion case such as Travel Agency.
As an example of nonprice predation, the court in Brokers'As-
sistant, Inc. v. Williams Real Estate Co." 4 found persuasive evi-
dence of opportunity to collude without "direct evidence
explicitly showing agreement among all the defendants," but
rather, from a substantial amount of evidence from which one
could infer the existence of a conspiracy. 15 Thus, the main argu-
ment in Brokers' concerned the sufficiency of the plaintiffs evi-
dence of the defendants' opportunity to collude.
109 Id. at 1243. See also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 260 F. 2d 397,
401 (4th Cir. 1958) ("The proposition is too elementary to require elaboration,
that participation in a criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence;
,a common purpose and plan may be inferred from a "development and a collo-
cation of circumstances."'" (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942))).
110 See Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222.
III See Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 526-27.
112 See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1233; Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 525; American Tobacco, 328
U.S. at 806.
113 See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1233.
114 646 F. Supp. 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
115 Id. at 1118.
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The Brokers' Assistant (TBA) compiled lists of available com-
mercial office space and prospective tenants. For a fee, TBA
provided its lists to commercial real estate brokers. TBA ob-
tained the information for its lists from brokers such as the de-
fendants. When the defendants all at once stopped providing
the information to TBA, TBA sued alleging that the defendants
had conspired to put TBA out of business.
TBA proffered a variety of evidence to show an agreement ex-
isted. First, a representative of one of the defendants met with a
TBA representative and stated that his real estate brokerage firm
would no longer provide market listings that he and the others
had been providing TBA and each other for quite some time.' 16
Then, the defendant called the other brokerage firms and in-
formed them that he was no longer providing the lists to TBA.117
Because there were disputes as to what exactly had been said in
these various conversations,"1 " defendants argued that this evi-
dence was inconclusive as to whether "defendants knew what
each other was doing, much less that any of them agreed with
any other."1 9
Instead, defendants argued that the evidence only supported
"findings of mere communications among competitors and con-
scious parallelism. ' 120 The court, however, disagreed with the
defendants' characterization of the evidence. Echoing Interstate
Circuit, the court observed that shortly after these conversations,
the defendants simultaneously reversed a long-standing business
practice. 2  Taken together, this evidence pointed toward
conspiracy.
In applying plus factors to Travel Agency, the two principal evi-
dentiary considerations are motive and the opportunity to form
a collusive agreement. 122 As discussed in the summary judgment
analysis, the facts of Travel Agency reasonably supported an infer-
116 See id. at 1115.
117 See id.
11 However, "[i]t is undisputed that at this [initial] meeting Cohen [defend-
ant's representative] also told Gross [plaintiff] that major brokerage firms . . .
would from that time on refuse to provide TBA with listings of available space."
Id.
IIl, Id. at 1117.
120 Brokers', 646 F. Supp. at 1117.
121 See id. at 1118.
122 Certainly others exist such as price parallelism and product uniformity, but
considering the nonprice predation element and the service-centered nature of
air travel, these other plus factors derived from pricing and manufacturing activi-
ties are mostly inapplicable.
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ence that the alleged antitrust activity made good business
sense. Proving an actual agreement to collude, in contrast,
might have been more difficult. But drawing upon the strong
indications of motive to cartel, coupled with the nonprice pre-
dation argument, the court would not have required direct evi-
dence of conspiracy as in Wilcox or Petruzzi's. Rather, ASTA
would have been allowed to rely on evidence showing that the
circumstances pointed to the existence of an agreement, or
more likely, a tacit understanding.
a. Motive in Travel Agency
As regards the first plus factor, motive, there exists strong sim-
ilarities between Brokers' and Travel Agency. 12 3 For example, in
both cases there were refusals to deal and the sharing of infor-
mation by the defendants. Also, both cases involved service
industries.
The defendants in Brokers'were large real estate brokers who,
for a commission, solicited tenants to rent office space in the
greater New York area. A substantial part of the trade was the
compilation of lists of prospective tenants and available office
spaces. These lists were customarily shared among licensed bro-
kers. The plaintiff, TBA, was a relatively young company that
developed a computerized brokerage system to coordinate this
solicitation process. It relied heavily on these lists, as did all real
estate brokers, and had invested a considerable amount of capi-
tal in its operations. TBA claimed that many in the community
favored using TBA's system, and that it provided better, more
efficient service without directly competing with the brokers. 124
Also, TBA claimed that by adding to the aggregate of listing in-
formation among brokers, it furthered the business interests of
all. 125
123 Note that Brokers' addressed these issues in a summary judgment proceed-
ing and presents no actual holding or findings based on any final adjudications.
See Brokers', 646 F. Supp. at 1117 ("The issue before this Court upon defendants'
motion for summary judgment is not whether TBA has presented enough evi-
dence to establish its antitrust claim. Rather, the Court only faces the question of
whether defendants have satisfied their burden so as to be entitled to summary
judgment.").
124 "Subscribers were enthusiastic about the service. Even non-subscribers ap-
peared to appreciate the benefit TBA conferred upon the real estate market." Id.
at 1115.
125 TBA also claimed that it provided a promotional services to the business at
large, because it "issued press releases, conducted surveys, placed advertisements
in newspapers and trade journals, joined the Real Estate Board, circulated pro-
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When the established brokers stopped providing these lists to
TBA, TBA's business was devastated. 126 The court found it clear
that without the lists, "the value of TBA's services to its subscrib-
ers was certainly reduced. TBA's 'faucet was turned off;' it was
'dead in the water."1 27
In justification of their action, the defendants claimed that
"TBA merely redistribute [d] listings provided by the brokers."'' 21
The defendants also argued that TBA was a free rider, using in-
formation on which they had spent time and money to compile
for their own use. 129 Although defendants attempted to intro-
duce evidence and arguments to support an inference of in-
dependent action, the court found only one reasonable
inference based on the nature of the defendants' conduct:
The inference of anticompetitive motives on the part of defend-
ants can be bolstered by engaging in some basic economic rea-
soning. If TBA's service survived absent any one defendant's
listings in its data base, but with the listings of all remaining de-
fendants, including the withdrawing individual defendant's ri-
vals, the withdrawing defendant would be damaged. Information
regarding its competitors' space would receive wider distribution
than information about its own space. Therefore, getting all the
defendants to join the boycott was essential for any one defend-
ant to succeed in suffocating TBA.511
Applying this same economic reasoning to the facts of Travel
Agency, the circumstances surrounding the commission cuts and
institution of commission caps indicates an anticompetitive mo-
tive and a plausible reason to collude. To begin with, the les-
sons learned during earlier attempts at unilateral cuts made the
airlines aware of their need to collude for the scheme to be suc-
cessful. That is, by acting alone, each stood a substantial risk of
loss of business and goodwill from their main distributors, the
motional brochures, gave demonstration and receptions for brokers (including
defendants), and canvassed potential customers." Id. at 1121.
126 See Brokers, 646 F. Supp. at 1116 ("TBA has cut its staff and moved to
smaller offices. TBA has curtailed its services and no longer provides listings of
retail stores and industrial space. In sum, TBA's business has declined
markedly.").
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1114.
129 See id. at 1119-20. By casting TBA in the light of a free rider, the defendants
hoped to invoke Supreme Court cases protecting the right of businesses to pro-
tect their investments from free riders. See id. at 1120 n.38.
130 Id. at 1122.
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travel agencies, similar to that between the movie distributors
and exhibitors found in Interstate Circuit.
Because of the volume of ticket sales generated through travel
agencies, agencies had the very real ability to negatively impact
one airline's business by encouraging travelers to book with
those airlines not cutting commissions. The source of this influ-
ence comes from the access travel agents have to the full gamut
of booking information and the ability to "weed" through it.
This is similar to the way TBA's services organized and con-
densed information to better facilitate market transactions. The
crux of the services provided by both TBA and the airlines was
simply better organized information. Not only did this benefit
consumers directly by enabling them to make better choices,
but it had the indirect commercial benefit of maintaining a
check against the airline's oligopoly.
More importantly, the airlines had to act together if they were
to create such a fundamental change in how airline tickets were
sold, which the Supreme Court in Interstate Circuit found telling
of collusion. In Brokers', the court was cognizant of the coopera-
tive relationship between TBA and the larger brokerage houses.
In Travel Agency, this synergy was far more pronounced. The
travel agents and airlines had developed a symbiotic relationship
spanning many decades. But fearing that travel agents were
benefiting too much from this relationship, or rather, that travel
agents were an easily eliminated cost of doing business, the air-
lines acted to force them out of business in order to strengthen
their oligopoly power, which they needed in order to charge
above-market, supra-competitive prices.
Another important similarity between these cases consists of
the strong consumer preference shown for the one being
squeezed-out. As with TBA, there is strong evidence that the
public generally favors using travel agents over direct booking,
even with the advent of the Internet. This reflects two factors of
the business of travel agencies that are, by themselves, docu-
mented by direct evidence. The first is that travel agents are a
better, more efficient way of retailing or distributing airline tick-
ets. The second is that ASTA has no qualms with existing in a
dual distribution system whereby the airlines develop Internet
service.13' If these factors were not true, then logically the pub-
lic would no longer prefer travel agents.
11 Two nationally syndicated columnists "emphasized the advantages of using
travel agents over booking travel on the Internet, noting that: 'a call to a travel
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Travel Agents is distinguishable from Brokers' because there is
no free rider problem that would strengthen the airlines' claim
that they were acting with legitimate business conduct. Travel
agents pay a substantial fee for computer links to scheduling
and bookings even though much of this information is available
free on the Internet or by calling the airlines directly. In return,
the airlines pay a commission for the travel agents' service of
bringing customer and carrier together.
Lastly, in American Tobacco, the Supreme Court ruled that evi-
dence of a rise in prices during a time of surplus indicates the
existence of a cartel. 13 2 When the defendants in that case sum-
marily raised their prices for cigarettes, the costs of tobacco and
manufacturing had been falling for years. 33 Therefore, the
Court could find no economic justification for the price in-
crease. 1 4 Similarly, the airlines slashed commissions at a time of
record profits and falling fuel costs and taxes. 35 The irony is
that "the airlines continue to raise their fares and cut commis-
sions for their primary distribution system (travel agents) while
raking in record profits. The airlines have realized a 600% com-
bined profit increase in the last year alone. 1 36 Yet, the airlines
claimed that the cuts were legitimate, independent actions to
reduce operating costs in their competitive market. Viewed in
light of the airlines' wide profit margins, such a claim seems
more like a pretext than a legitimate business decision.
b. Opportunity to Collude in Travel Agency
The other principal plus factor ASTA would have had to es-
tablish is the airlines' opportunity to collude. ASTA had no di-
rect evidence of an agreement, not even an informal agreement.
agent will produce the lowest fare and book a flight in a single swoop. The agent
can also handle other travel arrangements, such as hotels and car rentals. Com-
puters can't suggest alternatives."' ASTA in the News, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alex-
andria, Va.), Nov. 1997, Issue II, at 4.
The Travel Industry Association determined that travel agents were the pre-
ferred source over the Internet and other sources from a survey based on the
following criteria: reservations, prices, types of vacations, schedules, where to go,
things to do, and maps. See Travel Agents vs. the Internet, DATELINE ASTA (ASTA,
Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 1997, Issue I, at 4.
132 See American Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 805.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 See ASTA Calls on Airlines to Pass Along Savings on Fuel Prices to Travelers, supra
note 91.
136 Agents Challenge Airlines: Provide the Same Level of Quality Travel Service,
DATELINE ASTA (ASTA, Alexandria, Va.), Dec. 1997, Issue I, at 1.
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ASTA did assert, however, that various meetings and other ex-
changes of information took place, which suggested an overall
subtle scheme of forming the cartel terms. This was in addition
to evidence of nearly simultaneous and identical cuts in commis-
sions. ASTA argued that the airlines:
participated in a knowing conspiracy involving public speeches,
electronic communications, subtle press releases, private dinners
for airline executives and attendant antitrust counsel, and indus-
try-bonding meetings at the Super Bowl and other locations.
Plaintiffs do not deny that the airline industry needs to control
costs, but argue it was not happenstance that each defendant,
within days, "stumbled" onto the identical price structure chosen
by their confederates. Plaintiffs seem to acknowledge the statisti-
cal probability that a cube of ice can appear in a vat of boiling
water, but doubt they have seen one yet.137
While it is for a factfinder to adjudicate the true evidentiary
value of these assertions, the district court found it compelling
enough to use it as a primary basis for allowing ASTA's case to
survive summary judgment.'38
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v United States,13 9 the Fourth Circuit
held that such communications between the defendants shortly
before the parallel behavior was sufficient evidence to sustain a
criminal antitrust conviction. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the mem-
bers of a mirror manufacturing association all sent their respec-
tive customers announcements of price increases within days of
returning from the association's annual convention. The
Fourth Circuit held:
[P]roof that PPG announced a price rise identical with that an-
nounced almost simultaneously by its competitors was not
enough by itself to convict. However, PPG's "conscious parallel-
ism," in light of its apparent close connection with the climax of
the conspiracy, reasonably permitted the jury to infer that PPG
sent the letters pursuant to an agreement with some or all of the
conspirators. 140
The district court in Brokers'came to the same holding under
similar reasoning. 4 1 The plaintiffs in Brokers' had no direct evi-
dence showing any agreement between the defendants. The
court, however, still denied summary judgment because the evi-
137 Travel Agency, 898 F. Supp. at 690.
138 See id. at 691.
139 260 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1958).
140 Pittsburgh, 260 F.2d at 401
141 See Brokers', 646 F. Supp. at 1118.
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dence that the defendants communicated with one another
shortly before the parallel conduct allowed a reasonable infer-
ence of a conspiracy. 14 2
B. UNREASONABLE RESTRAINT OF TRADE
Assuming ASTA could have successfully proven concerted ac-
tion with the intent to collude, it would then have had to prove
the final element, unreasonable restraint of trade. There are
two means of proving that a restraint of trade is unreasonable
and harmful to competition. The first and easiest way is to pig-
eon-hole the business activity into a pre-recognized category of
unlawful conduct' 43 These categories comprise business prac-
tices that are so facially anticompetitive that further inquiry is
unnecessary. 44 Generally, the courts will find firms in per se
violation of section one of the Sherman Act when they collude
directly, or indirectly through persuasion of others in the mar-
ket, to deny a competitor access to a supply or facility that the
competitor needs to compete.145 Also, the colluding firms usu-
ally enjoy a dominant position in the marketplace.' 46
When the conduct is not a per se violation, courts apply the
Rule of Reason. 47 Under this analysis, the plaintiff must prove
that the anticompetitive effects outweigh any procompetitive
benefits. "'
The conduct in Travel Agency is a vertical restraint, which falls
under the Rule of Reason. 49 The airlines argue efficiency (or,
142 See id.
143 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 (1985).
144 See id. at 289-90; see also Northern Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958).
45 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294; Harkins Amusement Enter.
v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F. 2d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 1988) (per se violation
"where joint efforts by firms disadvantage competition by inducing suppliers or
customers to deny relationships the competitors need in order to compete").
146 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294.
147 See id. at 295-97; Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977).
148 See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294.
14, Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the per se rule is not entirely
inapplicable in this case. In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the plaintiff failed to get
a per se ruling because it still had access to the relevant market. See id. at 295 n.6.
Even though the facts may not make out a prima facie case under the per se rule,
"[s]uch activity might justify per se invalidation if it placed a competing firm at a
severe competitive disadvantage." See id. Thus, the assertion by the defendants in
Travel Agency that travel agents still have access to book tickets might not provide
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reduction in transaction costs), freedom to change their
method of distribution, and freedom not to deal with competi-
tors, none of which necessarily indicate blatantly unlawful be-
havior. There is also evidence, however, that the airline industry
is concentrated enough that vertical restraints would be a viable
means of accomplishing market dominance. 150 Therefore, any
vertical restraints imposed in this industry should be subject to
careful Rule of Reason analysis.
1. Evidence of Anticompetitive Effects
The Rule of Reason draws a thin line between legitimate busi-
ness conduct and anticompetitive conduct. Because the distinc-
tion is often difficult to make, the courts require compelling
evidence of adverse anticompetitive effects.1 5 1 Proof of actual
detrimental effects, however, is not necessary if an analysis of the
pertinent market structure shows that the defendant has the
ability to set prices independent of market forces. 15 2
Situations involving a dual distributorship, where suppliers
sell both directly to buyers and through independent dealers,
fall under vertical restraint analysis. 153 In the dual distributor-
ship between airlines and travel agents, an unreasonable re-
straint can take the form of an unlawful refusal to deal, proof of
which hangs on this difficult distinction between legitimate busi-
ness conduct and unlawful anticompetitive behavior. 154
One method of determining an unlawful refusal to deal is the
Intent Test, 15 5 which attempts to distinguish a firm's right to
a strong defense if their actions severely impeded the travel agents' ability to do
business. Also, evidence of horizontal collusion among the airlines to eliminate
travel agency commissions would invoke per se analysis. See Illinois Corp. Travel
v. American Airlines, Inc., 806 F.2d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1986).
150 See Klingaman, supra note 31.
15 See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380-82 (1967).
152 See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986); NCAA v.
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984).
153 See Arnold, Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 372.
154 See Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 603 F.2d 1107, 1113-16 (5th Cir. 1979)
(discussing the distinction between concerted activity that is an innocent aspect
of business and concerted activity that is inimical to competition).
155 Compare Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that a facility is essential "only if control of the facility carries
with it the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market.") with Of-
ficial Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 925-26 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding
that the essential facilities doctrine was not applicable because the monopolist
publisher of flight schedules engaged in a different line of commerce than the
plaintiff air carrier).
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deal with whomever it pleases (legitimate business intent) from
monopolistic practices (anticompetitive intent).156  The
Supreme Court held in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp.157 that the right to refuse to deal with a competitor is not
absolute. 5  Rather, there might exist limited circumstances
when cooperation to some degree is necessary for effective com-
petition and consumer welfare.'5 9
Aspen is a ski resort comprised of four major skiing venues, 6 °
three of which were owned by the defendant, Ski Co.'61 Entry
into the market is limited by geographical considerations and
government environmental regulations. 6 2 When each venue
was individually owned, an interchangeable ticket replaced the
older tickets good for only one venue. This new ticket system
was based on a similar method used in the Alps and quickly be-
came popular among skiers who wanted to ski throughout
Aspen. Over the years, the interchangeable ticket continued to
improve. It became easier for skiers to use, and the revenue
allocation system became more accurate.
However, after Ski Co. had acquired three of the four resorts,
it began to express a desire to discontinue the ticket's use, stat-
ing that it wanted to compete for skier loyalty directly and elimi-
nate the "administratively cumbersome" method of ticket
monitoring.'63 In response to Ski Co's criticism that the method
of revenue allocation was inaccurate, the plaintiff, Highlands,
offered to hire a third-party auditor to audit the revenue alloca-
tion. In addition, Highlands offered to accept a fixed percent-
age of total ticket revenue that was well below the actual
percentage of time skiers actually spent at Highlands' facility. In
the end, Ski Co. simply rejected all of Highland's offer and dis-
continued participation in the interchangeable ticket.
The plaintiff's attempts to operate without the joint tickets
were frustrated by Ski Co.'s misleading advertising and other
156 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
157 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
158 See id. at 601 (reaffirming Lorain Jornal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143
(1951)).
159 See id.
-6 See id. at 587-88.
161 See id. at 589-90.
162 See Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 588.
163 See id. at 591-92.
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tactics. 164 Moreover, the plaintiff was unable to- protect itself
from its loss of revenue and skiers. "The development of a new
distribution system for providing the experience that skiers had
learned to expect in Aspen proved to be prohibitively
expensive." '1 6 5
In support of its position, which was accompanied by an ami-
cus curiae brief filed by American Airlines, 166 Ski Co. asserted its
right not to cooperate with its competitors. 167 Ski Co. could not,
however, offer any plausible efficiency justifications for refusing
the interchangeable ticket. Its new ticket system was no more
efficient than the one it replaced.
168
Echoing Interstate Circuit, the Court consequently found that
Ski Co. was not motivated by efficiency concerns but "was willing
to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill" to inflict
injury on its rival.169 The Court focused on how Ski Co.'s actions
brought about a fundamental change "in the pattern of distribu-
tion that had originated in a competitive market and persisted
for several years."'170 In addition, this distribution system was
practiced throughout the world, which supported Highlands' ar-
gument that this was the most efficient method of selling lift
tickets. 17 ' Furthermore, consumers were benefited from this
joint lift ticket. Instead of having to go to the individual compet-
itors for access, they could buy one ticket for access to all of the
164 See id. at 593-95. These other tactics are also forms of nonprice predation
where the goal is to raise a rival's cost above his income. See NONPRICE PREDA-
TION, supra note 65, at 8-9.
165 Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 608.
166 See id. at 587.
167 "Aspen Skiing Corporation is required to compete. It is required to make
independent decisions. It is required to price its own product. It is required to
make its own determination of the ticket that it chooses to offer and the tickets
that it chooses not to offer." Id. at 598 n.22.
168 See id. at 609.
169 Id. at 610-11.
170 Id. at 603. "In any business, patterns of distribution develop over time; these
may reasonably be thought to be more efficient than alternative patterns of distri-
bution that do not develop. The patterns that do develop and persist we may call
the optimal patterns. By disturbing optimal distribution patterns one rival can
impose costs upon another, that is, force the other to accept higher costs." Id. at
604 n.31 (quoting R. BoRKx, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 156 (1987)). "In § 1 cases
where this Court has applied the per se approach to invalidity to concerted refus-
als to deal, 'the boycott often cut off access to a supply, facility or market neces-
sary to enable the boycotted firm to compete... and frequently the boycotting
firms possessed a dominant position in the relevant market." Id. at 604 n.31
(quoting Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294).
171 See id. at 603.
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resorts. 172 Consumer surveys and expert testimony indicated
strong consumer preference for, and reliance on, the inter-
changeable ticket.1 73
Applying this case to Travel Agency, it becomes clear that there
exists a credible allegation of unreasonable restraint on the part
of the airlines. Consumers have shown a preference for making
their travel arrangements through travel agents. And a similar
dual distribution system of selling tickets had evolved between
the travel agents and the airlines both in this country and
around the world.
The relationship that developed over the years benefited both
travel agents and airlines. Travelers could either buy their tick-
ets directly from the airlines, or if they wanted "thorough coun-
seling," could patronize "full-service agencies. ' 174 In this way,
travelers had differing levels of service based on their particular
preference.1 75
American [Airlines] has no particular reason to cram unwanted
money down the throats of travel agents. If travel agents are
charging too much for their services, why does American not re-
duce the commission and thereby angle for passengers with
lower net prices at no cost to itself? It must be purchasing some
sort of valuable service from these travel agents. 1 76
Both distribution systems were similar in that the relevant
services were not "resold." In Aspen Skiing, the resorts ran their
respective ski lifts independently of each other, but revenues
from the ticket did not reflect actual usage. Instead, revenues
were based on percentages. Thus, there was the potential that
the distribution system resulted in one resort bearing the risk of
reduced sales revenue of the other. In Travel Agency, the airlines
established their independent schedules and pricing, which
were provided to travel agencies through ARC to sell to consum-
ers. As with any true agency relationship,'7 7 the principal, the
172 See id. at 605-06.
173 See id. at 606-07
174 See Illinois Corporate Travel, 806 F.2d at 728. The Seventh Circuit empha-
sized that the plaintiff was not alleging conspiracy among the airlines, but be-
tween one airline and other travel agents. See id. at 726. The court did not
express an opinion as to the legal effects of such a conspiracy between airlines,
but it did seem to have a strong opinion that travel agents are important to the
industry at large.
175 See id. at 729.
176 Id. at 728.
177 "The relation of travel agent to airline is not substantially different from the
relation of broker to real estate owner, of brokerage house to investor, or of
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airlines, bore certain risks that were not passed on to the
agents. 171 However, travel agents accounted for eighty percent
of all domestic airline sales.
179
Of course, the airlines would like the funds "siphoned off' by
commissions but they have offered no real efficiency justifica-
tions for eliminating travel agents. Without the travel agents,
the airlines will have to bear the administrative costs of ticket
sales themselves; therefore, it is incorrect to assume that without
the travel agents these costs will simply disappear.
In fact, the added administrative burden might prove to be
more costly. For example, there is the cost of redundancy.
Travel agents pooled their expertise and services at one location
but sold tickets from all of the airlines. Now, each airline must
have its own distribution system. Furthermore, the airlines'
ticket sales staff cannot provide the sort of expertise and cour-
tesy that professional travel agents offer.
Finally, like the ski resort in Aspen Skiing, travel agents faced
difficulties in adapting to the new business circumstances in the
face of nonprice predatory conduct. Travel agents were already
tied to the airlines with exclusive dealing contracts in order to
have access to airline schedules, prices, and bookings. Com-
puter programs providing the access, such as SABRE, are not
free, and in fact require commitments to long-term contracts.
Thus, as travel agencies faced reduced commissions, the added
liability of long-term, expensive contracts was further incentive
not to stay in business.
Travel agencies also incurred the added expense of lobbying
efforts and public relations campaigns in an attempt to stay prof-
itable with the new commission policy. In light of various legal
obstacles and strong consumer resistance to the new printing
fees, these added costs only increased the burdens on existing
travel agents and discouraged new agents from entering the
market.
travel agent to hotel, rental car company, or other provider of travel services." Id.
at 725; see also Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 3 ("Through accreditation
by ARC, the travel agents are agents of the defendant airlines with respect to the
sale of airline tickets and, in essence, serve as the airlines' distribution system.").
178 "The travel service operator takes no risk of unfilled seats or of the many
problems, from mechanical difficulties to weather, that may make the airline un-
able to deliver transportation as promised. The airline takes all credit risks on
the credit cards it accepts .... [T]he travel agent loses its commission when the
traveler does not show and has his ticket refunded, but this is true of any agent
when a sale falls through." Illinois Corporate Travel, 806 F.2d at 725.
179 See Plaintiffs' Complaint, supra note 4, at 3.
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2. Balancing Procompetitive Effects with Anticompetitive Effects.
The courts recognize that some changes in a vertical distribu-
tion system benefit consumers by improving efficiency, and
thus, promote interbrand competition. 180 In order to separate
those vertical restraints with the "redeeming virtues" of promot-
ing competition from those that facilitate collusion or the exclu-
sion of rivals, the Rule of Reason is implicit in every decision
sustaining vertical restrictions."8 1 However, it is much easier to
assert improved efficiency than it is to prove.182 First, economic
analysts find measuring the difference between transaction costs
between vertically related firms and transaction costs within a sin-
gle vertically integrated firm problematic. This in turn makes
proving the procompetitive benefits of vertical mergers diffi-
cult."' Therefore, a defendant must prove through concrete
facts all issues relating to efficiency, including the efficiencies of
alternatives and the impact on consumers.184 Second, those effi-
ciency savings that can be proven will be taken into account
among other factors, but do not constitute an absolute de-
fense. 5 In fact, cost savings to the integrating firm are not rele-
vant; rather, "efficiences are relevant only to the extent that they
can be expected to result in benefits to consumers."186
The efficiencies defense works well when applied to firms that
produce goods that are later resold through retailers, and the
courts have developed the defense within this context. The rea-
sons usually given for legitimate vertical integration is the need
to eliminate distortions from various forms of market failures,8 7
to facilitate the flow of information between levels, or to mini-
180 See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54 (1976).
181 See id.
182 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.5 (1984).
183 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION: MONOGRAPH No. 14, NON-HoRIZONTAL
MERGER LAW AND POLICY 8 (1988) [hereinafter NON-HoRIZONTAL MERGERS].
184 See id. at 90 (referring to the second criteria suggested to the courts in eval-
uating efficiency claims as posited in U.S. Department of justice's Memorandum
in support of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Relating to Efficiencies 4, 13-18,
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 83-51-D (S.D. Iowa, May 4,
1987)).
185 See id. (quoting U.S. Department of Justice, Statement Accompanying Re-
lease of Revised Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,826 (1984)).
186 Id. (quoting in part the five criteria suggested to the courts in evaluating
efficiency claims as posited in Department of justice's Memorandum in Support
of Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Relating to Efficiencies 4, 13-18, United States v.
Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., Civ. No. 83-51-D (S.D. Iowa, May 4, 1987)).
187 Such as build-ups in inventory, cyclical problems associated with markets,
and coordinating non-peak load production periods.
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mize transaction costs in advertising, sales presentations, etc. 188
These costs represent situations that occur at the retail level and
pose financial uncertainty on the producer.
Vertical merger theory and the efficiencies defense have not
been developed in the context of the retail role played by travel
agents. Looking at the reasons for vertical integration in this
context, there are few potential procompetitive effects of verti-
cal integration. Travel agents, who were already well-established
in their role as independent agents, posed none of the tradi-
tional concerns that a producer might have over what occurs at
the retail level. First, travel agents were the most efficient means
of ticket distribution, a state of affairs that always benefits con-
sumers. Second, there were never any quality control problems,
and travel agents had little impact on an airline's overall man-
agement or investment decisions. Third, the airlines were not
bound to restrictive retail contracts like many upstream retail
suppliers. Rather, the airlines were making a considerable
amount of money from the fees travel agents pay for access to
computerized airline schedules and bookings such as SABRE
and ARC. Finally, travel agents were paying for supplemental
advertising and other promotional activities from which the air-
lines directly or indirectly benefited. Therefore, what first ap-
pear to be legitimate efficiency claims begin to look more like
the displacement of an efficient distribution system. Indeed, at
the end of 1998 one travel agency stated that when the agency
middlemen are cast off, "consumers will have to pay more even-
tually when airlines hike up fares to hire people to do what
[travel agents] do.' 1 89
Another consideration is whether the airlines may be seeking
to eliminate a lower link in the distribution chain to facilitate
horizontal collusion. Thus, the focus shifts from the retail-level
firm to upstream, market-dominate firms that will be in the posi-
tion to form a stronger oligopoly as a result. Anticompetitive
consequences are likely if (1) the upstream firms are generally
prone to collusion already and (2) a large share of the upstream
product is sold through vertically integrated retailers.' 90 When a
market is highly concentrated, it is considered oligopolistic if
188 See id. at 87-91.
18 See Connolly, supra note 7.
190 See NON-HoRIZONTAL MERGERS, supra note 183, at 81 (referring to U.S. DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.221 (1984)).
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price parallelism is common.' 9 ' Clearly, the airlines have a his-
tory of following each other's lead in pricing, commission cuts,
and other business practices. In fact, they have even admitted to
parallelism, albeit natural parallelism, and have been the subject
of criticism for growing ever more concentrated. 19 2
In the business environment after Travel Agency, the condi-
tions at the horizontal level become more conducive to collu-
sion. Without the travel agents' ability to funnel customers and
provide expert advice, and thereby foster competition via help-
ing upstarts and supporting those with the best deals,9 3 airlines
can more easily collude. That is, for those airlines that want to
cheat the horizontal cartel, travel agents would pose a tempting
resource to use in undercutting the less-competitive offers from
the cartel members. In the absence of travel agents, it becomes
easier to monitor the cartel members, and there is less incentive
and opportunity to cheat. 194
Similarly, the airline cartel may need to eliminate a disruptive
middleman to strengthen its market dominance. "Successful
collusion in the upstream market often depends on relatively
acquiescent buyers in the downstream market. Aggressive buy-
ers can disrupt a cartel's operations by encouraging cartel mem-
bers to cheat the cartel policy."'19 5 By analogy, travelers who buy
directly from the airlines will be more at the mercy of the air-
lines than travel agents, who are more aggressive in curbing air-
line oligopoly power.
III. CONCLUSION
One could infer from the facts of Travel Agency and its sur-
rounding developments that the airlines engaged in nonprice
predation to bring about a fundamental change in the business
environment of the air travel industry. Although there was no
191 See 1995 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS GUIDELINES OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL § 4.8, Mar. 27, 1995. Practices constituting price parallelism
in this context include: (1) price leadership, (2) pre-announced price changes,
(3) price rigidity in response to excess capacity or diminished demand, (4) pub-
lic pronouncements and discussions of the 'right price' for the industry, (5) sys-
tematic price discrimination, and (6) past collusion regarding prices or
marketing practices. See id.
192 See Klingaman, supra note 31.
193 See Airlines That Have Not Cut Commissions, supra note 69.
194 See NoN-HoRIzoNrAL MERGERS, supra note 183, at 80-82 (discussing that de-
creasing the costs of monitoring cartel performance is one prerequisite to form a
cartel).
195 See id. at 82.
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one single piece of evidence conclusively establishing antitrust
violations in Travel Agency, the facts and the inferences drawn
from those facts demonstrate that this sort of conduct could rea-
sonably occur in an industry as concentrated as the airline in-
dustry. Airlines have every business incentive to build a cartel.
Only through a cartel's collective power could the airlines drive
travel agents out of business and retain those funds that are nor-
mally paid out in commissions. Moreover, once travel agents
are eliminated, the airlines gain added oligopoly power to facili-
tate the full range of collusive practices such as parallel price
maintenance.
When the airlines cut commissions paid to travel agents, they
justified their actions as a more efficient, cost-saving measure
and promised that these savings would lead to airfare reduc-
tions. But the post-commission cut era has not led to the prom-
ised reductions in costs and airfares. In January 1998, Kiplinger's
Personal Finance Magazine reported that "[a] irfares have taken off
over the past year or so, and it will probably be a while before
they come back down to earth," with business passengers being
hit hardest.' 96 Earlier in 1996 and 1997, business fares increased
by 9% and 16%, respectively, and 1998 saw a 5% to 6% increase;
since 1994, business fares have increased by 30%. 19 7 By the be-
ginning of 1999, the major airlines were again announcing
airfare increases "on business tickets by 2 percent and leisure
tickets by 4 percent, effective immediately,"' 98 while some ob-
servers have reported an average increase of 3% and 7%,
respectively. 99
Analysts blame a strong economy and increased demand for
travel as the reason behind the increase, z°° but others have men-
tioned the oligopolistic dynamics of the industry, whereby the
airlines tend to act either in unison, or not at all, for fear of
losing business to others.20 1 With these rate increases, "the in-
dustry's profits are likely to rise to a record for the fourth
straight year. "202 It also seems evident that the warnings of the
196 Woods, supra note 1, at 127.
197 See Guy Boulton, As Air Fares for Businesses Continue to Rise, Some Find Ways to
Contain Cost, THE COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 18, 1998, at 1E.
198 Heather Pauly & Francine Knowles, Airfares on the Rise, 4% Hike for Major
Carriers, CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Jan. 30, 1999, at 1.
199 See Chris Woodyard, Firms Stretch Travel Dollars Higher, Costs Bump Employees
into Coach, or Even into Vans, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1999, at lB.
200 See Boulton, supra note 197.
201 See Pauly & Knowles, supra note 198.
202 Id.
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travel agencies, prior to their minimization, may be bearing
true. Without travel agents to temper the effects of the airline
oligopoly, the airlines are far less shy in taking advantage of
their position. Because there are no real alternatives for travel
in the United States or internationally, and because modern so-
ciety and commerce require travel, the airlines now have one
less check on their control of market prices. While businesses
are certainly allowed to find ways of cutting costs, they may not
do it illegally. Instead of being a legitimate business move, the
airlines' actions appear to be an attempt to drive travel agents'
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